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What do prison inmates and frogs have in common? Apart from being animals
populating this planet, not much, one would say, awaiting the punch line of an
apparent joke. The answer though is sobering and thought-provoking at the sa-
me time: both prison inmates and frogs (as many other species, e.g., sparrows
and crustaceans; see Searcy and Nowicki 2005) engage in aggressive interacti-
ons in which they ﬁght over status, territory, and other resources, making their
solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short lives more pleasurable. However, even
for the strongest individuals, ﬁghting entails costs in terms of energy and in-
juries. Therefore, not ﬁghting is preferable if the same results can be achieved
by other means. This is literally easier said than done. Frogs happen to croak
and the dominant frequency of their calls is correlated with body size, the main
determinant of dominance in aggressive interactions. Unlike frogs, body size of
prison inmates seems not to be a reliable indicator of ﬁghting ability (Gambetta
2009, 84). Yet there are other cues that convicts observe to assess their inmates’
violence potential. In chapter four, Diego Gambetta gives a systematic account of
the signals and signs prisoners send and display and explains how these provide
information to other inmates about their toughness.1 While prisoners painful-
ly learn which cues to watch for, the theoretical lens through which the author
looks at the ethnographic evidence on prison life is one of signaling. The main
theoretic idea is that certain acts entail costs that only individuals with certain
qualities can afford. As these qualities are not directly observable, but pertinent
to the interaction, such acts must truthfully convey information about the un-
derlying qualities. For instance, scars from knife stabs or bullet wounds indicate
that someone has been through many ﬁghts and has survived. In aggressive in-
teractions these are credible signals of ﬁghting ability where as a deep voice or
a manly walk are not. The latter could be easily faked and would not hold out
against contenders.
* I thank Liz David-Barrett for helpful comments.
1 A sign can be anything perceptible in the environment and can be understood as a signal when de-
liberately displayed or pointed at to change the observer’s beliefs in the context of the interaction
(see deﬁnition on page XV).10 Wojtek Przepiorka
Apart from sending signals indicating toughness, prison inmates can build a
reputation for being tough. However, the only communicative acts able to deter-
mine somebody’s rank in the prison hierarchy are ﬁghts or other vulgar displays
of power. As soon as everybody’s ﬁghting ability is revealed, interactions between
prison inmates can run more smoothly, albeit to the detriment of the underdogs.
Based on theoretical considerations, Diego Gambetta derives testable hypothe-
ses about the conditions under which ﬁghting in prisons is more or less likely to
occur. One particularly interesting implication is, for instance, that ﬁghting will
occur more often in prisons with a stricter regime. If encounters between priso-
ners are rare because inmates are not free to roam around, information is less
likely to be transmitted and thus must be generated through action. Gambet-
ta cites more than anecdotal evidence in support of his hypotheses, throughout
the book. Yet it becomes apparent that there is way too little empirical research
systematically exploring the social life of the underworld. The numerous cited
accounts of special agent Joseph Pistone, alias Donnie Brasco, who successfully
inﬁltrated two maﬁa families in New York in the late 1970s, show how difﬁcult
and dangerous unobtrusive observation can be for an FBI agent, not to mention
for a social scientist.
Uncertainty in social interactions is abundant in the criminal world. Crimi-
nals cannot simply ask whether or not someone is a gangster willing to buy two
pounds of heroin or use the Yellow Pages to ﬁnd co-offenders. Even if they were
able to (because undercover agents had not yet been invented), they could not
rely on the legal system to ensure that the other party abides by the ‘contract’.
Mistakes, false assessments, or even gullibility or a trusting nature are things
criminals can ill afford. The underworld is a sociological niche bereft of formal
institutions and sympathy. Moreover, the constant threat of harsh punishment
provides a strong incentive for rational thinking. Ironically, it is again criminal
acts that provide the decisive means of communication allowing mobsters to si-
gnal their trustworthiness to co-offenders. In chapter one the author discusses
the various ways in which criminals establish their credentials. To take a rather
extreme example, an undercover agent would never commit a murder just to
prove that he can be trusted, making murder a perfectly discriminating signal.
In general, the graver the offense the less likely it is that a wannabe maﬁoso
or an undercover agent can afford to commit it. The same logic applies to the
length of a prison sentence. The market for criminal acts relies on crimes provi-
ding costly signals that establish trust among potential co-offenders. Moreover,
the time spent in prison allows criminals to acquire the human and social capital
necessary to be competitive in the criminal labor market.
After Streetwise: How Taxi Drivers Establish Customers’ Trustworthiness
(Gambetta and Hamill 2005), this is Diego Gambetta’s second book to put si-
gnaling theory into action. Codes of the Underworld comprises two parts with
ﬁve essays each. While the ﬁrst part is concerned with the communicative acts
which aim at credibly distinguishing the ‘real’ types from the ‘phony’ types, the
second part discusses a different class of signals which the author calls conven-
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understand the same meaning from the signal. Moreover, unlike the notion from
signaling theory, conventional signals as such are not causally connected to the
particular qualities of the sender (Gambetta 2009, 150). Thus, a conventional
signal can be anything the meaning of which is shared by at least two people.
On the one hand, mere words, gestures, or objects can be agreed to have a par-
ticular meaning in secret by a group of criminals. An argot allows the members
of the group to communicate with each other without being understood by outsi-
ders. On the other hand, conventional signals can be easily misunderstood and
mimicked as the author demonstrates with numerous examples in chapters six
and seven. Therefore, even though conventional signals are used by criminals to
communicate with one another, their meaning must be maintained and protec-
ted to make them costly to acquire by outsiders. For instance, tattoos denoting
membership in a criminal organization are—apart from the pain one endures
while being tattooed—purely conventional. Members of the Japanese yakuza
or the Russian vory used to punish non-members who wore their insignia. The
protection of conventional signals by punishment implies, however, that the cri-
minal organizations can identify non-members by other, more reliable means.
Diego Gambetta’s book opens a window on the variety of mechanisms and
means of communication in social interactions, not only applicable in the under-
world. It also makes apparent how multiplex communication can be and how
far away formal models are from what we think is relevant for our understan-
ding of social interactions. Costly signaling only applies under special conditions
in interactions with asymmetrically informed agents. Together with other well
known concepts such as repeated encounters, reputation, social norms and con-
ventions, costly signaling is part of a broader theoretical framework which tries
to pin down the conditions under which rational and self-interested agents en-
gage in cooperation. It is not the aim of this book to advance existing formal
models of communication or develop new ones. It is, however, a signpost for eve-
ryone engaged in formal modeling of social interactions.
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